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Abstract—The lack of security measures in the Internet of
Things (IoT) devices and their persistent online connectivity
give adversaries an opportunity to target them or abuse them
as intermediary targets for larger attacks such as distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) campaigns. In this paper, we analyze
IoT malware with a focus on endpoints to understand the affinity
between the dropzones and their target IP addresses, and to
understand the different patterns among them. Towards this goal,
we reverse-engineer 2,423 IoT malware samples to obtain IP
addresses. We further augment additional information about the
endpoints from Internet-wide scanners, including Shodan and
Censys. We then perform a deep data-driven analysis of the
dropzones and their target IP addresses and further examine
the attack surface of the target device space.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the number of seamlessly connected and online
IoT devices soaring into the 10’s of billions [1], potential
adversaries set such devices on target via malicious codes.
Such codes or malware not only infect the devices themselves
but also receive updates from their Command and Control
(C2)/dropzones around the world. Forming a network, these
devices have the potential to launch attacks on other targets
resulting in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [2].
Reckoning that the malware sources, C2 servers, the in-
termediary targets, and the victim must be connected to the
Internet for the attacks to happen, studying these endpoints is
important. This work attempts to understand such endpoints
to decipher such patterns. In particular, we extract endpoints
from IoT malware samples and perform a data-driven analysis
to understand geographical affinities and their exposure to risk.
Our work is important given its insight into understanding
the Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), and the behavioral
aspects necessary for threat hunting. Specifically, we make the
following contributions: 1) IP Centric Analysis: We investigate
the target IP addresses among different dropzone IP addresses.
Additionally, we analyze the locations of dropzones and their
target IP addresses. Moreover, we analyze the risk associated
with the IP addresses through insights gained from Shodan [3].
2) Network Centric Analysis: For the masked target endpoints,
we examine the entire network and study the network devices
and their exposure to risk.
II. DATASET CREATION
Our primary dataset contains a total of 2,423 IoT malware
samples collected from IoTPOT [4]. We design a tool to
Fig. 1. Attack trends between dropzones and target IPs corresponding to
dropzones having over 500 target IPs. The orange circle represents dropzones,
and blue, red, and green circles stand for target areas.
reverse-engineer each of the malware samples and extract the
IP addresses from the malware code base. In total, we extract a
total of 106,428 target IP addresses, resulting in 2,211 unique
target IP addresses associated with 973 malware samples. We
also find a total of 2,407 IP addresses, resulting in 877 unique
dropzone (source of attack)/C2 IP addresses corresponding
to 2,318 malware samples. We notice that only 40% of the
2,423 malware samples contain target IP addresses, and a
total of 95.66% of 2,423 malware samples contain dropzone
IP addresses. Additionally, we augment the IP addresses with
other details including their: country, city, Autonomous Sys-
tem Number (ASN), and location, using online DNS and IP
lookup tools like the UltraTools [5]. Furthermore, we utilize
Shodan [3] to obtain the vulnerable endpoints.
III. IP CENTRIC ANALYSIS
A. Dropzone-Target Inter-relationship
We examine the affinity between the dropzone and the
target IP addresses and find that ≈77% of the unique target IPs
receive less than 10 attacks, while we see that one unique target
IP received 72 attacks. We also find a dropzone IP associated
with one malware targeting 1,265 target IP addresses, which
is significantly larger than the average (121).
Shared targets between dropzones. To inspect the shared
targets between dropzone IP addresses, we group the drop-
zone IP addresses and capture the common targets among
the dropzones. There were 2,199 cases (12.11%) with 100%
overlap between dropzones. Overall, we found 6,451 cases
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TABLE I. TOP 5 NUMBER OF TARGET AND DROPZONE IPS BY
COUNTRY. Countries include: United States (US), Netherlands (NL), France
(FR), United Kingdom (GB), Italy (IT), Vietnam (VN), Brazil (BR), China
(CN), India (IN), and Pakistan (PK).
Country # Dropzones %Total Country # Targets %Total
US 1,041 43.25 VN 26,290 24.70
NL 278 11.55 BR 20,572 19.33
FR 188 7.81 CN 15,799 14.84
GB 183 7.60 IN 5,598 5.26
IT 177 7.35 PK 5,076 4.77
(35.53%), with >80% overlap, and 886 cases (4.88%) with
<10% overlap. If the target IP addresses between different
dropzones are identical, it is possible that the attacker obtained
the same targets through similar vulnerability analysis (e.g.
Shodan) or shared the target list from other attackers through
underground communities.
B. Geographical analysis
In this section, we focus on the distribution of the distances
between the dropzones and their target IPs. To visualize the
flow of attacks in a holistic sense, we plot circular areas whose
sizes are proportional to the number of targets placed according
to their average position (not the exact position) on a world
map with geodesic lines originating from various dropzone
locations. Fig. 1 shows the country-level perspective of the
relationship. We observe a large concentration of target areas
focused in Central Asia.
The distribution of dropzone and target IPs by country
is shown in Table I. We notice a large distribution of drop-
zones from US pointing to targets in Asian countries such as
Vietnam. Additionally, China and Brazil are target of attacks
originating from European countries. Imperva Incapsula states
that Vietnam (12.8%), Brazil (11.8%) and China (8.8%) were
the countries with the most-infected devices (from the Mirai
botnet) [6].
C. Network Penetration Analysis
This section focuses on analyzing attributes gathered from
Shodan and Censys [7], namely, active ports, vulnerabilities.
Active Ports. For each dropzone and target IP address, we
use information gathered from Shodan and Censys the list of
active ports. We extracted 5,745 active ports from 716 of 877
dropzone IPs and 1,114 active ports from 129 of 189 non-
masked target IPs. Each port number is typically associated
with a service, such as port 80 for HTTP traffic. While we
observe common services like SSH (port 22), HTTP (port 80),
and HTTPS (port 443), we point out to the usage of Network
Time Protocol (NTP) on port 123. NTP is UDP-based and can
be prone to “IP spoofing” for DDoS attacks [8]. This attack is
also emphasized in [9], since the attacker can amplify attack
packet size 1,000 larger by exploiting NTP.
Vulnerabilities. We then examine the susceptibility of the
IP addresses; in particular, we determine the vulnerabilities
present in the IP addresses. We gather the Common Vul-
nerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier, maintained by
MITRE [10]. In our analysis, the second-most common CVE
among the dropzones: CVE-2014-1692. The NVD [11] reports
the severity of this vulnerability as “high” since it might allow
remote attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) through
memory corruption due to uninitialized data structures from
the hash_buffer function in OpenSSH.
IV. NETWORK CENTRIC ANALYSIS
We observe the malware targeting multiple IoT devices for
propagation. In this regard, they often mask the endpoints on
target. For such endpoints, we analyze their CIDR network. In
total, we inspect 27 unique /24, 435 unique /16, and 125 unique
/8 IP addresses. Towards this, we evaluate and analyze these
networks to investigate their exposure to risk. In particular,
we examine the devices on these networks and looked at the
services being used.
The corresponding 100,793,403 active IP addresses are
then clustered by their device type. Considering that open
ports lead to increased security risks, we look for ports that
are necessary for a device to operate uninterrupted. Taking a
conservative approach, we suggest that if a port is being used
by less than 10% of devices in a given device type, it should
be closed to reduce its exposure to risk. Our results show the
susceptibility of high-wattage IoT devices, such as heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), power distribution
units (PDU), etc., can be abused by the attackers to launch
large-scale coordinated attacks. Additionally, the high presence
of such susceptible devices lays the foundation for attacks as
demonstrated by Soltan et al. [12].
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we analyze the ≈78.2% of total responsive
public IPv4 endpoints among dropzones and their targets as
extracted from IoT malware and spread across the globe from
diverse perspectives. Additionally, we augment our analysis
results by leveraging the use of IoT search engines like Shodan
or Censys.
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